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Recent developments n reI iabil ity Illodel in9 for fault toler-ant avionic cOlllputin~ systems are pre-
sented. EmphaSis is plac d on the modeling or large systems where issues of state size and complexity. 
fault cove.-age. and pract cal comput-1lion al-e addressed. 
A two-fold (analytical modeling) d€velop"lcntal "ffort is describp.d based on the "structural lIIodelin~" 
and "fault cover'age modeling" approaches. I·Jith regar-d to the structural modeling effort. two techniques 
under study are examined. One technique which was successfully appl ied to a 865 stdte pure death stationary 
Markov model is presented. The model ing technique is appl ied to a fault tolerant n;ultiproce5sor currently 
under developmcnt. Of particular interest i" J short cO:llputer pl-ograrr. which executes very quickly to pro-
duce reliability results of a large-state space model. IIlso. this model incorporates fault coverage states 
for processor. memory. and bus LRU's (Line Replaceable Unit). 
II second structural reliability modeling scheme Which is aimed at solving nonstationary l1arko" models 
is discussed. This techniquc which is under development will provide the tool required for studying the 
reliability of systems with nonconstant failurr rates and includes intemittent/transiem, faults. elec-
tronic hardware which exhibits decr~asing faih'-e rates. and hydromechanical devices which typically have 
wearout fai lure mechanisms. 
A grneral discussion of fault coverage and how it impacts svstem design is presented together with a 
historical account of the research which led to the cUI'rent fault coverage developmental program. Several 
aspects of fault coverage including modeling and data measurement of intermittent/transient faults and 
latent fJults are elucidated and illustrated. The CIIRE II (Computer-Aided Reliability Estimation) coverage 
is presented and shortcomings to be eliminated in the future CARE III are discussed. 
The emergence of the so-called latent fault as a significant factor in reliability assessment is 
gaining increased attention froll1 a modeling viewpoint; therefoi'e. nuances of latent faults. models for such. 
and a method for latent fault measurement are depicted. 
1. INTRODliCTION 
The importance of achieving a faithful reliability assessment capability for avionic fault tolEl'~nt 
systems cannot be overstressed. Reliab;lity issues involve virtually every aspect of design. packaging. 
and field cperations. with regard to safety. maintainability. and invariably profits. Successful imple-
mentation of digital fault toler~nt computel's for critical flight functions in commercial aircraft cannot 
be realized without rigorous and credible analytical and simulative demonstrations of system reliability 
and fault tolerance. This conviction is fostered by the observation and supported by analysis that life, 
testing to demonstrate the ultrareliability of these systems l'Iill be impractical. and because of ~he safety 
aspect. the full potential of such systems will not be realized until system reliability and fault 
tolerance are substantiated. 
The task of producing a credible reliability assessment capability is indeed a formidable one. The 
root of the problem is embodied in the very essence that makes the digital computer such an attr:.ctive 
device fo" use in a host of applications. namely its adaptability to changing requirements. computational 
power. and ability to test itself. 
Among the many factors to be considered in the design of fault tolerant systems are those which can 
have iI direct impact on reliability. These f~ctors must be accurately accounted for in a faithful relia-
. bility a'>sessment. Figure 1 depicts SOr:le of the more important eleml;nts delineated into four categories: 
(1) Type and r1anifestation. (2) Cause. (3) System Effect, and (4) Defense. Every digital avionic fault 
tolerant system must be designpd to effectively cope with a myriad of har<1war~ and software anomalies 
which i1re classified in categories 1 and 2. Categories 3 and 4 typify the effect of anom31ies and some 
te~hniques for coping with them. Figure 2 portrays the combinations of cate~oric:; 1 and 2. For example. 
a hard>lare anomaly could be a permanent t'dndu," failure. On considering the nll~,bf>r of devices in a digital 
system that are susceptible to failure in the ~Iays depicted in figure 2 and combining soft~lare anomalies in 
a similar manner. one quickly begins to apP"f'ciate the designer's and the reliability analyst's tasks in 
accounting for these factors in reliability assessments. II rigorous discussion regarding Sume of these 
factol-s is given in McCluskey aTid Losq, 197fl. 
From d reliability asseSSI"~nt vie~lpoint. it was not until recently th'!t analysts began to account for 
these f,'ctors (Roth et al .• 1967) .:lith th(' probabilistic concept of fault coveragc. Since then. numerous 
reports have appeared on till'? effects of fdult coverage accountJbi 1 ity (UI trJ-Sys tcms. Inc •• 1974; Bavuso. 
1975; and lljurman et a1.. 1976). 
RcliabilHy IIIfHkl inlJ research at the tlr,s", Lan'Jlcy Research Center has been strongly influenced by our 
fault tlller.,'," rl)mpoJtl~r at-chit",;t"r'!l rt!';"'lr':t1 r,rn',ram ~'hir.h tlJlIIII:encen circa 1971 with the initiation of a 
study on t.I". ,. ·',;'111 of a r .. ult Tolcrar:t r-irb~rn!! Di'Jit.ll (fJlIIllIltcr (WI'T1s1ey et ilL. 1973. and Ratner et al.. 
1973). Th;- . 'JI idcntifipd tWJ potcnli.,lly viable C()l!Iputl'" drchilecturcs for aircraft fliuht control 
, ·r 
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applicati0ns. They are thC' sirr (Softlw'e Ifllplemented Fault Tol('rance) Jnd the FTIIP (Fault Tolerant 
Multiprocessol') (~Iensley et aI., 197H, ,md Hopkins and Smith, 1975 .]r.d 1978). [loth architectural concepts 
utilize lIIultiple LSI (LJrtIC Scale Inte9r.Jtion) proceS~OI' and fIIel"'J"}, dcvices, r('sultin<j in a large "u",ber 
of SRU's (SIII.t11est ReCllnfilJlIl\\hle llnits~. From a rI'liability lIIodc>ling point of vielv, this schcllle contrib-
utE'S hl'adly to the Illodel in9 (om\llexity by inCt'Colsin'J thc nllmbe,' of possible ope"dtiorlal hJrdware states. 
This state of affairs has focused ollr research in the direction nf developin~ modeling techniques that are 
~ppli:Jhle to lJr'I~-stilt" models. FOI' convl'niellce, thi5 lI1odelin9 thrust will be referred to as the 
structural andlytic drpI'OdCh. A parallel effort to tile structu,'al analytic appruach was initidted by d 
study in 1973 I<llich produced the Coml
'
utc"-I\ided Reliability E';lifllation (CARE II) computcr progr'arn, To 
date. the CARE II faul t covel'ol~e model rep"esents the mas t advdnc<,ri genel'a 1 i zed !llode 1 pub 1 i shed in the 
open liter<ltur~, It was this study which launched the Langley fault cove,'age modelin'.J approach. 
Because it is anticipated that viable fly-by-wire digital falllt tolel'ant systems for aircraft flight 
control I<ill be required to meet unreliability requirements of (less than or equal to) 10- 9 per flight and 
to be prJctical (less than or equal to) 10- 9 at 10 hours. reliability models must be implemented in analytic 
form in lieu of simulation moct'ls; 11cIVevcr. the use of very high spt'ed emulators and/or para11el computers 
may at sonle futlu'e tillie diminish the analytic app"oach's dominance. This i, not to say that simulative 
techniques are not presently applicable in reliability modelin~, On the contrary. simulation plays a major 
role in determining vital reliability p~ra",eters associated with fault coverage modeling. 
3, STATE-OF-THE-ART MODE~ING PROBLEMS 
The state-of-the-art of structural analytic modeling of large systems is typified by the reliability 
analySiS method employed in the ARCS (Airborne Advanced Reconfi~urable Computer System) study (Bjurman 
et al .• 1976), The solution technique is matrix oriented and is based on constructing a similarity rela-
tion sllch that the transition matrix is simillr to a diagonal matrix containing the eisenva1:'es along the 
diagonal. For pure-death Harkov processes with distinct eigenvalues. this solution method h extremely 
fast in a gRneral purpo~e digital computer and. thus. very attractive for use in large-state space models. 
With some minimal care in aSSigning failure rate data so that, for all practical purposes. the system 
eigenvalu('s are mathematically distinct, this solution scheme is applicable to a large class of computer 
archi tectures of practical interest. Such a system is the FTMP which was analyzed at Langley using the 
described method. An abbreviated state transition diagram for the FTMP appears in figure 3 where a system 
state is defined as the 6-tuple vector. (a.b.d.c.e.f). where 
a = number of working processor modules 
b = number of processor modules in a recovery state 
c = number of working memory modules 
d = number of memory modules in a recovery state 
e = number of working bus modules 
f = number of bus modules in recovery 
and the SRU's are the processor, memory, and bus modules. Initially the system is in state , 
(lO, o. 10. O. 5. 0) and the final state is (5. O. 2. 0.,2. 0). Further loss of hardl'/are is considered 
system failure since crucial flight functions cannot be effected. Elements. b, d, and f describe states 
involving recovery. In addition to system loss resulting from hardware depletion, system failure occurs 
(in this model) when a second fault occurs within a recovery interval. This condition was imposed because 
the FTMP's primary fault detection and isolation mechanisms are based on a functional level software 
majority voting scheme, In actuality, the Fmr can recover from many double failures; however. the double 
failure constraint was necessary to reduce the stolte size of the reliability model; fortunately. it also 
produces a conservative reliability estimate. Several other necessary conservative assumptions were 
required to bring the state size dmvn to a m.lnageable level; in this case. a 865-state model resul ted. 
Although 865 states for a reliability 1lI0del is considered very large by industry standards, this analysis 
presented no problem for our Control Data Corporation eVBER 175 computer. In fact. a mission time of 
10 hours required only 74 CPU seconds. 
Aside fl'om the surprising low CPU time of such a complex analysis, another unexpected outcome 
resulted and is 5ho~m in figure 4. The probability of system failure in 10 hours is plotted against 
processor fa il ure rate per hour for the 865-s ta te model with 10 processors. 10 memories. and 5 buses; and 
for a 673-state model I'lith 10 processors. 8 lIlen'ories. and 5 buses. The data ShOl'1 that the addition of 
2 memory modules increased the 5ystem probability of failure. This trend also applies if in lieu of 
"processor" appearing in fiCluI'e 4, "memory" or "bus" is plotted, One explanation for this unexpected data 
is the sensitivity of the reliability model to the occurrence of a second fault during recovery. Deyond a 
particular hard~lare complement, increasing h,wd\'ldre redundancy diminishes sys'.em reliability because of 
the increased likelihood of additional faults. If the constraint that a second fault occurring in a 
recovery int.erval fails the system were relaxed. the results \'iil1 change ir, favor of increasing redundancy, 
The pl'nalty for increased real ism is a considerable increase in the model state size. To date, a practical 
upper bound on the state size for the matrix solution technique previously discussed has not been explored. 
On the pessimistic side, it 15 sobering to rCdlize that the 86!>-state model was reduced ·from approximately 
10 mi 11 ion s ta tes through the impos it ion of certa i n conservati ve cons tra i nts on the model. 
The state-of-the-art of reliability mod,!lin'l of large systen,s hds progressed one step beyond that 
already dc',cribed to include transient f.lUltS, Thi5 amounts to addinq the transient failure rate 
(transition rate) to hardl'Mre failure rates to account for per5istent transient faults that behave lHe 
permanent fault:; (lljurfll,Hl et al.. 1976. an,j N(l. 1976). The reliability contribution due to the time the 
machine spends in the recovery stat.e because of a transient is not acrurately modelE'd: As IliOst analyses 
assume con5tant transient transition rates. onp. can i'lnnre tlte recovery state a",! combine the transient 
transition rate .lith the penllo1nent fault tran5ition rate. 
Ttd~ sCl'nario of the·state-of-the-art of reliability modelinq for fault toll'rant systems surely must 
convey the notion of mod .. l in(l inaccuracie',. not. to mention t!<f! COIlSpiLUOUS ab'cnce of an'y discussion of 
sofb/arc anomal ies dnd other anollial ies purtr;lyed in figure 2, Lven though lhe reI iabil ity analyst ntdkcs 
" 
every dttempt to be cfIIl .. r-rv,ltiv(' \,h('n 11(' CJnllot ue ,Kcl.:rJtr.. !!IOrC oftl:n th,In not he is forced into ~ co",pro",isin~1 position th,lt I'"is~s dl)!lut lind dilllinishes (Ilnfi<knce in the dndlysls. 
4. AJiQ.V.E_I,.._AFPIlOAC!1 (OI~f:rL.I.AnII IJ_Y.Jcs.~[~sr:~[!H 
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In the aforcm~nti0ncd andlysis of the FTMP, irr~spcctive of software cJllsiderations. the major suspects whiLh cII,11lc1lge both .tll·.' accuracy and the cvnsl'I'v,ltism of tr.e analysis are the transient and fault recovery tt'edt/i,rnt. In bolll C3Sl'S. it was dssIl"ied th,lt the state transition rates are constant and values for these were determined by educ,ltcd llUCSses. Also. it was assuII,ed that the latency time is zero (ShcdlC't~,ky and ~kClus~ey, 1976). Trends in reliability "lodeling technology for fault tolerant systems are bein~1 driven lJy the need for "nalytic techniqu(;s capable of modeling fault tolerant systems with state sizes on the order of 1000, to include sensors, actuators, and their computer interfaces. Ther~ is mourting evidL'llc( tihlt ccrt,';n electronic devices exhibit nonconsti'nt hazard rates (Timming, 1975, and Shooman, 1974); and mechanicdl and hydt'aul ic devices commonly exhibit wE'arout, i.e., increasin~ ha.~Jrd rates with time, These observations coupled liith the need to accurately account for fault lJtl'nt"j', intermittent/transient faults, and softl1are failures present a strong case for an analytic trclmique capable of modeling nonconstant hazard rates. 
The development oi such a technique is curt'ently under study and will result in the development of a General Computer-Aided Reliability f.stimation (CARE III) computet' program. The desire to reduce the large state sizes fOt' ~tat'kov processes vis-a-vis CARSHA (Co~lputel--Aided Redundant System Reliability Analysis, Bjurman et al., 1976) and the nerd to treat non~onstant hazard rates directed the study toward a general-i zed Markov process concept, namely the processes i n ~ihi ch the Chapman-Ko 1 mogorov equa ti on hal ds: 
P~i(t •• ) = ~ Pvi(s,.)P~v(t,s) 
v 
for all • < s < t. where Pii(t,.) is the probability that the system is in state R. at time t given that it was in state i at time 1 (Feller, 1957). By judicially defining system states to satisfy the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation, the forward Kolmogorov equation can be satisfied under some very general conditlons: 
-PR.i(t.1) AR.i(t.1) + L Pji(t,r> Cj R.i(t,1)Aj R.i(t,.) 
jfR. 
If the notation indicating the condition that the system be in stat1'! f at time t be suppressed, the following recursive equation results: 
where 
,PR.(t) probability of being in state R. at time t 
AjR.(t) transfer rate from state j to state R-
AR.(t) = 2: AR.j(t) 
j 
CjR.(t) = overage associated with a failure \'Ihich, if coverage \1cre perfect. would cause a transfer from state j to state R. 
The system reliability is given by 
for the set L of allowable state~. 
R(t) 2: Pt(t) 
9.",L. 
From a computational point. of view, a more ~ccurate form is obtained by letting 
where p;.(t) pv.(t) given perfect c(Jverage. The system unn'li.lhility Q(t) is 'liven by 
r 
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ott) = 1 - kIt) = 2: 01.(t) + 2: p;'(t) 
HL IE:L 
with L u being the set of all possible SldtcS. And Ejl(t)· 1 - Cjt!t) so that 
The vir-tues of this scheme are that theJ1JZcird I·ate Aj£(t) 
the contribution to syst£,111 um'e1 iabil ity due to pe,-fect and 
the Aji(t) was previously discussed, but the importance of 
and coverage Cjt(t) are time dependent; also 
imperfect coverage is decoup1ed. The need for 
Cjt(t) was not presented. 
In avionic syste'ls which utilize dynanic resource alLxation schemE'S such as is possible with the 
FH1P and SIFT systems, the llI'oportion of IhlrdlVare and soft"are ,-esources is dependent on the aircraft 
flight phase and/or flight envelope. Flight critical phases requi"e greater hardware redundancy and fault 
monitoring. The latter factor appears in reliability models as time-varying coverage Cji(t). A more 
subtie need for cji(t) is to account fo'- fault latency. The probability of system failure due to 
insufficient coverdge is a function of the number of existing failures embedded in the system. That is, 
the probability of a second SRU (processor, bus, memory) failure occurring during the T second recovery 
time is a function of the nwnber of SP;'s functicning at that time. 
Preliminary studies of the Kolmogorov technique are encouraging from an accuracy viewpoint and com-
puter run time. Figures 5 and 6 cOlilpare FHIP reliability data generated with the Kolmogorov technique 
against data generated lVith other conventional t'echniques. To make a meaningful comparison, C;t(t) 
and Aji(t) were constrained as constant~ in the Kolmogorov technique. It is suspected that tlie cds-
crepancies depicted in figure 6 are attributed to simplifying assumptions required to keep the conven-
tional analYSis technique tractable. 
Current work on CARE III is directed toward developing a coverage model compatible with the Ko1mogorov 
technique and is based to a large extent on the CARE II coverage model (Raytheon Company, 1974 and 1976). 
Improvements to be sought are modification for coverage time dependency (Cjl(t)) to model latent faults 
and of greater difficulty, to reduce the burden placed on the user in defining input data for the modified 
CARE II coverage model. A third improvemc~t is to include a more sophisticated intermittent/transient 
fault coverage model and if possible a softl'lare failure model. . 
The CARE Ii coverage model is a pOYlcrful basis upon wllich to build the Koln'ogorov coverage model 
(KCM). In its completed form, the KCt1 will detel1:line coefficie~ts for the Kolmogorov reI iabi1 ity model 
(KREL-~l). Coverage is conceived as consistins of three fur~dari1enta1 p,-ocesses, systerr fault detection, 
fault isolatiDn to the SRU, and recovery, .:hich may ,-equire hardware replace.llent and/or softl'lare correc-
tion. Failure to properly effect one of these processes constitutes a coverage failure which is usually 
modeled as a system failu,-e. A faithful coverage model must provide the mechanisms by Ylhich the relia-
bility analyst can relate the coverage coefficients to the system factors that affect coverage. These 
factors include the faul t classes (perrc,anent/interiTIi ttent hardl/a,-c/soft.lare faul ts), the system faul t 
detection mech~nisms (software/hardware voting, software self-monitoring, BITE (Guilt In Test Equip~ent), 
etc.), SRU fault isolation mechanisms (simililr to detection), and recovery procedures (hardl,are replace-
ment, instruction retry, etc.). Detectors arc modeled as competitors in the detection process. Every 
detectOl- has some chance of discovering a fault; hOlVever, most detectors usually are specialized for a 
particular class of fuults. In CARE II, this model ing process is under user control. It is assumed in the 
cover~ge model that the detector which discovers a fault is most capable of defining fault isolation and 
recovery ~trategies. These strategies are user defined. 
where 
The CARE II coverage model takes the following form: 
conditional probability system can recover from a fault in stage x given the fault 
~elon9s to fault class j and is detected by detector i * 
detect i on time 
isolation time 
defective spare detection 
spare unit test time 
'A stage is defined as ~ set of ideotiLal devices. 
.-\ 
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Pj noncompet it ivc <l~trction prrbabi 1 ity 
Pj' isolation prouaoil ity ~ssociated \;ith Pi 
hi isolation rate 
ri rc~overy probability 
9i competitive detection rate 
Of all of tliese parameters, 9i(1) is the 1II0St difficult to obtain because it is a function of 
detector i and the entire enscmble of detectors and their interrelationships. 
5. ACQUISITIO~ OF COVERAGE DATA 
Assuming success in modifying the CARE II coverage model for the KREL-M, some difficulty in using this 
capability still remains. Eventucl11y the analyst must obtain cove,'aye data peculiar to the system of 
interest. Three types of data are urgently required: intermittent hazard rate data incllJding duration 
densities, fault detection densities for various classes of faults and detectors, and software hazard rate 
data. Th~,'e is some encouraging news on the first two; a discussion on the third is beyond the scope of 
thi s paper and \~ill not be addressed further. 
A source of intermittent arrival data has been identified and work has recently commenced to generate 
a data base of intcrtnittent field hard"are failure data in digital electronics*. The long-term aim of this 
endeavor is to produce inter'mittent hazard rate data for a variety of digital devices using different parts 
technology but applicable to avionics. 
Beyond the pressing issues sUITounding soft\~are rel iabil ity, val idity and/or val idation, characteriza-
tion of the latent fault ranks in equal ilPportance to the eventual success of utilizing digital systems for 
flight critical functions. Gecause of the near infinite numbe,' of possible machine states that a digital 
computer can ootain as a result of failures, it is impossible to exhaustively test such a device to deter-
mine its health. Therefore the presence of undetected faults is al~ays a possibil ity, and for systenlS 
designed to obtain system probabilities of failure of less than 10- in 10 hours of flight, even small 
probabilities of latent faults occurring can have a large effect on system reliability. It is certainly 
with these thoughts in mind that designers incorporate redundancy; however, the cost of constructing 
machines "hich tolerate more than three coexisting manifested faults becomes r-rohibitive. An acceptable 
[olution is to constantly search for faults and eliminate their effects so that the machine is never pre-
sented with two coexisting manifested faults, i.e., only one at a time. To insure that this goal is 
satisfied, the designer must have a priori kne\·ilcdge of fault occurrence and manifestion rates so that 
adequate fault detection and recovery mechanisms can be i.ncorporated. 
There are a number Gf detection schemes; the most obvious is compariscn/voting and can be implemented 
in at least one of t~o ways: by executing a special software test and comparing expected results with 
computed results (self-monitoring) or t,,~o or more uniprocessors can compare functional level outputs during 
nonnal computation ~Ihere both processors are execut ing the same code. The time between fault occurrence 
and its detection is the latency time. If this time is short compared "ith the failure rate of SRU's, then 
the machine will essentially ,ee single failures and have sufficient time to cope with them. Long latency 
times are conducive to system failure. 
In an atte:npt to detennine methods of acquiring latency data, a study entitled, "I~odeling of a Latent 
Fault Detector in a Digital System" \'laS conducted (I:age], 1978). A very simple computer (VSC) modeled at 
the gate level ~Ias designed and simulated to execute on a CDC CYGER 175 host computer. Six Simple pro-
grams were written using the VSC that consisted primarily of the following instructions: 
Fetch and store 
Add and subtract 
Shift right and shift left 
AND and OR 
Indirect addressing 
Overflow indicator 
Branch 
Copy to and from temporary storage 
While the VSC c:xecuted each of the six programs, single faults were induced random uniformly over 
the gate list. Inp~t, output, stuck-at-one, and stuck-at-zero faults were equally likelY occurrences. 
Initially the number of runs mdnife:sting faulty output was recorded and produced the following results: 
ESTIHATED ESTIHATED 
DETECTION STANDARD 
PROGRAM SAr1PLE SIZE DETECTIONS PROBAB I LI TV DEVIATION 
Fibonacci (FI£l) 211 98 0.464 0.034 
Fetch and Store (r&S) 118 42 .356 .044 
Add and Subtract (A&S) 208 117 .563 .034 
Search and Compute 118 64 .542 .046 
Linear Convergence 133 78 .586 .043 
Quadrat ic 97 55 .577 .050 
,-------- ._------_._,- -------
*NASA Contract Nurnh(;r, NASI-J5574 with S[J(!fry Univac. 
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Extl'n~ivp d.ll..J tll1.11yc:.i(~ \.,.\'j ,'('rfol'lih'd to l'\pl.,jll I he' (I11';('I'\'t'~i diff(ll·l'IICI.~5 in tt'rln<; of the Ilumbcr' of 
px('cutpd ill~tI·lh.:li()ll$. t1h.' IILWlhlt" of dilft'l"l'nt lf1strucL1nl;~. lJ',cd in cnl11jlut..ll.inll. till! d('qr(\t~ (If brdflr.hinq, 
the f..lUlt 1110dl' (~.luck-.It-l)fle lJ)' zel'O, input ()," out!I:ll). ,111,1 n111ldJCI' SiLl;. Ttll' result,,; of th(~ ~t"tic;ticdl 
dlllllys:.·s indir.lti' th.lt LJtl~IlCY ti::H'. l'r I'QQlv.il('lltl,Y, Ut'l{'\ t.i,lIl ('11'.II,i I it,', dl'p(~rJd::; IJI'ililt,l'ily (Ill the 
in~,t.t'uct.lun sut,-;{·t u'~rd durillq COP;I'lIt,lticll ,llld ttlt.' In'qlH'1l1 v 'Ii it~) usc. Ndl'(,()\,pr. little din:'ct 
dt'jlf'lh.trnc(' ''1,1<; ol";f'I'Vl'd fcw StJ(11 LH.:t~ll'~1 .IS Llul t n:llde, lIul\jh~I' si~(', deql'l'0 of hr'tll\chill~J, and rr'ogt'dnl 
l('ngth. An rXI'",,,'nti,ll tI),'oel I~,l, PI'ol'<)seci ano ilpplicd to tho' data fl'OIll three l'roqt',JllIS ,,",dd Jn~ 5ubtrJct, 
Fibonacci, und ~l'lcil JnJ Stllrc), 
TIle exponential mL)ei"l is b.1'cd on the density function of y; min (t, n, 1~!l':,rc t is the detection 
time ",~asurt'd in repetitions Jnd T is '.h<' truncation tbl,· of test, and is given by: 
c'-" 
y < T 
f(y) P c-H i Q y T (°0 1 - Po) o 0 
0 E 1 sel"hel'e 
where 
the detection probahility 
the probabil ity of nondctect i on for 0.11 time 
the prohabllity of nondetection due to insufficient test time 
Values for Po and A ~,ere obtainrd using maximu:n likelihood estimators, enabling the following 
data to be generated: 
Pro..9.~am Po ~ 'A I PQ. 
A&S 0.568 0.577 1. 02 
FIB .474 .491 1.04 
F&S .371 .398 1. 07 
A pictorial repl'esentation of this model is 5hOl'/l1 in figure 7 superimposed on the ra\~ data in 
histogram form. 
If after careful testing, this method of rneasurin~ and modeling fault latency proves to be acceptable, 
an important set of co\'el'age parameters lIi11 become aVdili:ble for reliability modeling. As an aside, this 
scheme also provides a n'ethod for synthesizing test programs both for pre-fl ight and in-fl ight monitoring. 
Testing digital syst(ms which perform flight critical functions is n0t a feasible method for estimating 
system reliability. An~lytic modelin~ of system reliability in conjunction Hith simuliltive techniques for 
coverage rne~surement appears to be the only ~lternativn on the horizon. Accurale rpliability estimates 
which accuunt for such factors as latent jaults, int('rmittent/tl'ansient faults, and soft'dare errors require 
sophisticated techniques \'Jhich are CUtTPlltJy being d('velo~lcd and I~ill result in the KREL-i1 reliability 
assessr.lent capabi 1 i ty cil:uad i cd in the CM,[ J J I COlliputc'r i"'0~I'~;". Th~ effects and s i gnifi cance of these 
factors on the reI iilbil ity of fault tolerant digital SyStCi:lS arc yet to be determined, and thr potential of 
increased complexity brought about ily tile incluslon of these factors in an assessment carability such as 
KREL-J·; is a majOl' concern. It is dllticipatt'd that after extensive tt'ade-off analyses, KRCL-11 will be 
simplified and take on more of the characteristics of a production tool in lieu of its initial experlmental 
character. 
In a parallel effort, methods for acquiring indispensable coverage data required by KREL-t1 are now 
becoming available. 
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